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ABSTRACT 
Although acquisitions are a popular way of internationalisation, the integration of acquired 
companies remains an arduous process that often impacts on the performance of the 
subsidiary or the overall organisation.  Difficulties associated with integration mostly relate to 
cultural differences, either national or organisational. This paper reflects on the experience of 
Finnish and Australian staff involved in the acquisition of an Australian company by a Finish 
company.  The paper points at problems and issues with business planning, vision sharing, 
effective management and leadership, cultural differences, cultural change, trust relationships 
and the integration environment as derived from literature and confirmed in the experience of 
interviewed respondents.  The findings drawn from the case imply that it is imperative to avoid 
an ‘us vs. them’ atmosphere while both management and leadership must be strong and 
unbiased.  Although a level of independence and identity should be allowed after the 
acquisition, integration of organisational cultures remains crucial for success. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To survive in today’s globalised business arena, companies must continually respond to 
numerous internal and external forces.  The ability to adapt and change sets the scene for long 
term success in the market.  Many companies turn to acquisition as a means of gaining access 
to products, markets, technologies and other critical resources for their business.  The over-
riding purpose of mergers and acquisitions is to attain strategic goals more quickly and 
inexpensively than if the company acted on its own (Marks and Mirvis, 2001). 
 
The real competitive advantage and performance benefits derived from acquisitions reflect a 
company’s ability to form and maintain effective internal and external relations between 
countries and cultures (Katz, Swanson and Nelson, 2001).  The ‘cultural forces’ generated by 
the acquisition process are often misunderstood or not fully appreciated by business executives.  
During the rush to effectively utilise newly acquired resources, companies often overlook issues 
of national and corporate culture diversity in their new relationships.  Acquisition integration 
strategies therefore often fail to consider cultural integration needs, misunderstandings, and 
difficulties between involved institutions, thus contributing to high rates of post acquisition 
failure (Marks and Mirvis, 2001). 
 
Performance downturns following acquisitions are often attributed to the mixing of, and forced 
changes in, company cultures.  Conflict and the process of finding ‘equal’ or ‘amicable’ cultural 
grounds between the acquirer and the acquiree, often hinder business performance (Gallegos 
n.d.; Morosini, Shane and Singh, 1998).  This paper considers arguments and models for 
acquisitions and subsequent integration and reflects on the nature of national and 
organisational culture.  It furthermore reflects on a Finnish acquisition of an Australian company 




The background section considers the acquisition rationale, the models of integration and the 
nature and impact of national and organisational culture from literature. 
 
Acquisition and integration of companies 
The acquisition and subsequent integration of companies into parent organisations is an 
extremely disruptive process for any business operation (Kellogg, 2002).  Although diverse 
forces of change causing disruptions have been widely studied, data suggest that acquisitions 
are poorly planned and do not benefit from experience.  Marks and Mirvis (2001) found that 
three out of four mergers and acquisitions fail to ever achieve their financial and strategic 
objectives. 
 
Changes required to accommodate the new cultures and management activities during 
acquisition integration not only affect business performance, but also place considerable stress 
on employees and stakeholders.  Business objectives need to take into account the human or 
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cultural factors that can make or break a strategic focus (Simpson, 2002).  Failure to place 
suitable emphasis on acquisition integration can easily negate the purpose or strategy of 
acquisitions (Marks and Cutcliffe 1988). 
 
Whilst there are numerous reasons for acquisition failure, Marks and Mirvis (2001) suggests 
that many companies become too ’financially tunnel visioned’ during the pre-combination phase 
of acquisition deals.  The acquiring company, often non-operations oriented, tends to focus on 
the hard factors involved in the transaction (Simpson, 2002).  Costs, values, transaction 
structures, tax implications and similar issues, overrule the ‘softer’ human resource 
management issues. 
 
Successful acquisitions require acquirers to clearly define synergies and boundaries included in 
their initial assessment criteria. These acquisitions begin with a strategic intent which 
scrutinises an organisation’s own competitive and market status, its strengths and weaknesses, 
often referred to as the ‘hard’ issues.  In addition, corporate and cultural orientations and 
human resource management, often called ‘soft’ issues also impact severely on the acquisition 
and integration process.  Both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ issues therefore play an important part in the 
decision to acquire a company (Simpson, 2002; Marks and Mirvis, 2001).  Such approaches 
appear to produce more effective cultural integration results. 
 
Models of integration of acquired companies 
Various models explaining business integration impose differing cultural challenges on 
companies.  These also tend to offer different outcomes of success following acquisition.  Four 
models of acquisition ‘integration’ are outlined by Marks and Mirvis (2001): preservation, 
absorption, reverse takeover and transformation. 
 
Preservation 
The preservation model of acquisition describes the situation where the acquired company 
faces a modest degree of integration and retains its ways of doing business.  Typically, 
companies operating with this model strongly promote cultural plurism among business units 
and encourage localised business and product development.  Effective integration requires 
protecting the boundaries of the subsidiary and maintaining effective business management 
control.  In many cases, preservation allows a newly acquired subsidiary to maintain its original 
structures, systems and employees to continue performance levels prior to acquisition (Kellogg, 
2002; Marks and Cutcliffe, 1988). 
 
Absorption 
During absorption integration the acquiring company takes full control of the operations of a 
new subsidiary, without serious regard for the original cultures and operations of the acquired 
company.  The cultures, structures and methods of the acquired company are assimilated to 
conform to those of the acquiring company.  This is often associated with the appointment of 
new management in the acquired company, variations of staff roles and responsibilities, and 
the enactment of considerable change (Kellogg, 2002). 
 
Reverse Takeover 
Reverse takeover is the opposite of the absorption model in that the acquired company dictates 
the terms of the integration and effects cultural change in the acquiring company.  Reverse 
takeover acknowledges the acquired company as having more preferred management methods, 
structures and abilities and forces substantial change upon the acquirer. 
 
Transformation 
Transformation based integration is where both the acquiring and the acquired companies find 
synergies between their operations and integrate to effectively capitalise on the ‘positives of 
each system’.  Benefits are gained from not only reorganising the companies, but from 
reinventing the companies. 
 
Although the model on acquisition integration impacts the functionality of either or both 
organisations involved, inherent organisational culture attributes will also impact on the process.  
The following section briefly outlines the nature of national and organisational culture. 
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NATIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
It is easy to oversimplify and miss the basic facets of culture, thus contributing to potential 
failure.  As one of the earliest researchers on culture and organisations Hofstede (1980) 
described culture as the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members 
of one human group from another.  Considering culture in the acquisition integration processes, 
three important issues need to be kept in mind.  Schein (1999) summarises these issues as 
follows: 
• Culture is deep.  The multilevel concept of culture shows that culture is an extremely 
complex phenomenon. Culture controls people more than people control culture.  
Culture allows people to develop beliefs and assumptions that eventually drop out of 
awareness and become tacit rules of how to do things, how to think about things, and 
how to feel. 
• Culture is broad.  Groups learn to survive in an environment through dynamics of its 
external and internal relationships. Culture affects all elements of individual or group life. 
• Culture is stable.  The members of a group want to hold on to their cultural 
assumptions because culture provides meaning and makes life predictable.  This is 
important, since humans do not like chaotic, unpredictable situations and work hard to 
stabilise and ‘normalise’ situations.  Any prospective culture change therefore 
contributes to anxiety and resistance to change. 
 
National Culture 
The deepest and most powerful level of culture represents the accumulated values and 
behaviours that arise from a society’s basic values and beliefs (O’Hara-Devereaux and 
Johanson, 1994).  National culture is essentially permanent and can change only over 
generations, manifesting itself in the form of common language, common orientation to context, 
time, power, equality and information flow. 
 
Hosftede’s (1980) studies into national culture in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s provided 
insight to some of the dimensions involved in formulating national culture.  The dimensions are 
not necessarily exhaustive and Hofstede and subsequent researchers have described cultural 
dimensions using additional dimensions and variables.  Hofstede (1980, 1991) proposed four 
fundamental dimensions of national culture, which he believed to be independent of 
organisational culture. The dimensions include power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism (versus collectivism) and masculinity (versus femininity). The relevance and 
complementarity of these value dimensions in the business environment are confirmed by Yeh 
and Lawrence (1995), Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) and Chow et al. (1999).  There is 
furthermore a positive relationship between power distance and behaviour towards business 
objectives and goals (Hofstede et al., 2002). 
 
Organisational Culture 
Like national cultures, corporate and organisational cultures within companies are not an 
espoused list of values developed and ‘written up’ by the executive team for all employees to 
read and abide by (although such actions may actually contribute to the developed cultures 
within organisations). The culture of an organisation also operates at conscious and 
unconscious levels (Gallegos, n.d.). 
 
Organisational culture is usually deeply rooted and shared by most members of an organisation. 
Organisational culture refers to formal, written company policy and the informal, unwritten 
behaviours that have become accepted by the group (Stoppler 2002).  Organisational culture 
drives the actions of a company and guides how employees think, act and feel.  Hagberg and 
Heifitz (2002) argue that while organisational culture is dynamic and fluid, it simultaneously 
represents characteristics of an organisation that are relatively enduring over time, and 
influence the behaviour of people in the organisation.  Schein (1992, 1999) and other 
specialists have challenged beliefs about the ‘content of organisational culture’ and questioned 
its relationship to national culture (Gallegos, n.d.; Maurice, Sorge and Warner, 1980). 
 
Traditionally research is focused on the boundary between national and corporate culture and 
their relationship to company performance (DeWitt, n.d.).  Some researchers demonstrate that 
organisational culture in companies is a universal concept, inferring that managerial tasks are 
similar across borders, and national culture has little or no impact on organisational culture and 
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performance (Hickson et al, 1974).  This school of thought argues that national cultures are 
moderated by organisational cultures, and that people within an organisation think and act 
similarly if working for the same organisation, regardless of their home country culture (Adler, 
1986; Florin, 2002; Maurice, Sorge and Warner, 1980). 
 
At the same time Adler (1997) argues that significant differences in national culture are 
dominant over organisational culture, implying that national culture determines methods of 
management.  Furthermore, national culture impacts on perceptions and behaviour in 
organisational culture (Hofstede, 1980; Laurent, 1983; Gallegos, n.d.).  National cultural 
differences are primarily a matter of ‘values’, while organisational cultural differences are 
primarily a matter of ‘practices’ (Hofstede, 1998). 
 
In a Finnish – Australian interaction context companies contemplating acquisitions or mergers 
face an interesting set of demands and circumstances to achieve success. Whilst both 
countries are relatively technologically advanced, have well educated workforces and good 
relationships as international trade partners; they also experience a large geographic 
separation, widely differing climatic conditions, different languages and time zone differences.  
(CIA, 2001; Ryan, 1997). It is therefore expected that any merger between Australian and 
Finnish companies would be challenging. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This paper reflects on the acquisition and integration experience of a Finnish Engineering 
company (FinX) acquiring a smaller Australian engineering company (AusY).  The case was 
studied to assess if different organisational backgrounds do inhibit effective integration of 
acquired companies.  The study involved collection of primary data from 29 interviewees 
associated with the company’s relevant business units, observation of artefacts and integration 
of information gained from literature.  Due to the shortfalls associated with quantitative research 
methods, a number of researchers have begun to conduct more qualitative approaches to 
studying organisational culture, both in order to supplement quantitative design and to stand 
alone (Nicolson, 1998; Hatch, 1997; Schein, 1992). These shortfalls include the simplification of 
socially constructed and diverse realities and the focus to establish a cause – result relationship 
between variables.  In contrast, qualitative research allows a more holistic understanding of a 
situation while accommodating individual experiences and interpretations (Fraenkel and Wallen, 
2003). 
 
Eighteen of the respondents involved in the data collection interviews were Finnish employees 
based in Finland; 9 were Australian employees based in Australia and another 2 were 
Australians expatriates in Finland.  The interviews were conducted in person in Finland and 
Australia during early 2002.  A questionnaire was constructed to collect data reflecting the 
perceptions and experiences of staff affected by and involved in the acquisition and integration.  
Although small in number, the respondents effectively represented the key individuals involved 
in the acquisition and integration process. 
 
Interviews were conducted individually in open and informal settings. Time was allocated for an 
‘interview introduction’ by the interviewer.  This included delivery of information of what the 
study and information collected was to be used for and to give a brief background on the 
generalities of the concept of culture.  The interview introduction also provided an opportunity to 
ensure participants that all information collected was to be kept anonymous and confidential. 
Time was spent on the introduction to improve the depth of information provided by 
respondents, to disarm individual suspicions that the company might have initiated the study 
and to confirm anonymity and confidentiality. 
 
The ‘base questions’ in the interview originated from relevant ‘open ended’ questions previously 
used by Schein (1999).  Whilst generally delivered as designed, questions were used mainly to 
act as ‘prompters’ for the interviewer and to entice open discussion of organisational culture 
issues. Respondents were invited to add as much comment and queries as possible at all times. 
 
Limitations of Study 
The major limitations of this study are associated with the depth and breadth of the study, 
which in turn questions the overall validity of the research data.  As suggested in earlier 
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sections, no study of culture can claim to be an ‘absolute’ investigation of the subject of culture 
due to the plethora of elements and dimensions involved (Schein, 1987).  The authors 
acknowledge that this research has been limited to the identification and interpretation of 
cultural issues central to the main (cultural) concerns in the company.  The results and 
outcomes therefore, cannot be considered as ‘typical’ or ‘normative’ in any way and are 
reflective of the companies involved in the case. Another limitation of the study was that it did 
not dwell on wider aspects of company acquisitions and integrations. Only some cultural 
aspects of acquisition integration are considered while other aspects that are likely to influence 
acquisition integration are not.  Although acquisition companies provide a situation to analyse 




The case environment explains the background of the two companies leading to the acquisition 
and the nature of the acquisition integration model.  It also considers important issues of culture 
integration derived from the case data. 
 
Background 
Before acquisition of AusY, the product range of FinX did not include all equipment and 
technologies required to design and supply base metal process plants.   AusY’s product line 
provided the ‘missing link’ to complete the equipment technology set.  A major objective of FinX 
was to establish a world leading position to provide a ‘total solution’ service, offering process 
plant design and supply, using entirely in-house technologies and equipment.   
 
AusY had been successful in the regions FinX was attempting to gain access into.  Due to 
success in chosen regional markets of Australia, South Africa, USA and Canada in the past, 
AusY’s management had not seriously considered expanding into other regions.  Although 
AusY was profitable and successful, international competitors and anticipated market 
downturns threatened their position.  The timing was therefore right to sell the company to a 
larger player that could effectively take the product to the ‘next level’ and globalise its 
distribution.   For FinX, acquiring AusY would realise the total solution objective while potentially 
serving the expectations of AusY. 
 
Acquisition Model 
With past apparent successes with German acquisitions (Kuisma, 1989), FinX was confident 
that their ‘transformation’ acquisition model was suitable for use in the Australian acquisition 
process.   The Australian management however favoured the approach of the ‘preservation’ 
model (Marks and Marvis, 2001). They believed their company had performed well over the 
past decade and that a change in ownership was no reason to disrupt the operations and 
functioning of the organisation.  AusY anticipated that historical achievements would translate 
into high levels of independence and preservation of culture, processes and systems.  FinX in 
turn expected AusY to become part of their push towards a full range and global presence. 
 
The actual execution of the acquisition and integration expectations differ even further with the 
strong ethnocentric management of FinX pushing ‘transformation’ towards the limits of 
‘absorption’ integration.  This was partly due to the different cultural expectations, both national 
and organisational, which points at the importance of managing the integration process. 
 
Key issues of culture integration 
Substantial differences in cultural dimensions were noted between the respective business 
units in the case.  In many cases, it was difficult to separate the specific influences of national 
culture and organisational culture dimensions of each business unit.  Concerns and issues 
evolved from differences in culturally derived assumptions and beliefs, which led to 
misunderstanding, mistrust and sometimes conflict between the business units.  Respondents 
noted a number of culturally related situations and concerns as examples of poor integration 
and alignment or hindering overall business operations.  
 
An analysis of responses allowed identification and inference of ‘key factors’ issues that the 
respondents believed would assist in the cultural integration process. The key factors identified 
were: 
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• Plan culture within the integration business plan 
• Develop a shared vision 
• Involve effective management and leadership 
• Identify differences between cultures 
• Manage cultural change 
• Build trust 
• Monitor the integration environment 
 
Business and Cultural Planning 
A complete organisational and cultural planning process includes ‘reality testing’ of potential 
synergies and differences in light of the two sides’ structures and cultures and assist in 
establishing a desired and agreed relationship between the companies and members of 
management (Buono and Nurick, 1992).  It also provides insight into employee attitudes 
towards conflict issues (Simpson, 2002).  The process of formulating the cultural plan in itself 
would assist in uncovering potential cultural concerns, allowing suitable adaptation and facilities 
in the business plan to counter concerns before they arise (Marks and Cutcliffe, 1988; Simpson, 
2002). 
 
Employees cannot be expected to understand and accept new cultural influences if 
management did not fully research, inform, accept, understand and plan the management and 
facilitation of changes, influences and tensions expected during integration (Marks and Mirvis, 
2001).  To integrate successfully management requires a specific integration plan and then 
needs to be willing to modify strategies to accommodate cultural diversity between business 
units as new cultural differences, beliefs and assumptions are identified (Walton, 2001). 
 
The most important element of effective planning is to ensure thought and consideration has 
been committed to various important elements and stages of business operations (Marks and 
Marvis, 2001; Buono and Nurick, 1992).  A set business plan incorporating cultural assessment 
of business units and cultural planning would have been beneficial to the acquisition integration 
process. 
 
In the case, it is important to differentiate between ‘business planning’ and ‘cultural planning’ 
activities.  Evidently a degree of ‘business planning’ had taken place to facilitate integration. 
The physical and legal acquisition processes had taken place and the operations had officially 
been placed into ‘integration’, as per the Finnish integration business strategy. 
 
The inferred approach to integration planning in the case lacks effective ‘cultural planning’.  
This ultimately contributed to culturally derived difficulties experienced between the business 
units of the company.   Additional cultural planning (as a sub-set of business planning) would 
have allowed management to better understand the artefacts, beliefs and assumptions of the 
different organisational cultures.  Providing allowances and plans for these issues before 
integration would address organisational and cultural pressures experienced in the operations 
before they occur (Adams, 2002). 
 
Shared Vision 
A shared vision for the business units should provide inference of what management expects to 
be the ‘end state’ of the combination. Having a shared goal allows better demarcation of the 
shared vision amongst management and employees.  With defined limits on how, where, when 
and with who to achieve goals people are able to focus their energy on common goals and the 
realities of the acquisition (Marks and Mirvis, 2001). 
 
Employees need to perceive reasons behind the company’s changes in a positive light and be 
given a context within which to see the actions in their own best interest.  A shared vision, if 
understood and embraced by all personnel, would thus help to create a sense of commonality, 
belonging and purpose between the business units.  The new combination of operations could 
then draw strength from individuals’ desires to be connected to important undertakings (Senge, 
2002).  This is particularly the case for the Australian employees, who drew motivational 
strength from the strong business focus they had formed in AusY.  Without the strong business 
focus and direction, respondents believed employees had little desire to exercise individual 
ambition and achievement. 
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Australian respondents indicated that the take-over led to the feeling of being ‘let down’ or 
‘betrayed’ by management.  These beliefs were based on negative assumptions that the future 
would not be as promising as the past.  This downturn in employee morale is an expected 
reaction for many companies on the ‘receiving end’ of an acquisition (Marks and Mirvis, 2001).  
To counteract this trend, management of both companies need to focus on commonalities and 
positives to be derived from the acquisition which can be achieved by forming a strong shared 
vision, and communicating this to all individuals (Adams, 2002). 
 
Australian respondents believe that promoting a strong shared vision would have assisted in 
restoring confidence and moral.  It would also assist in dispelling negative feelings towards the 
‘sell-out’.  Before the acquisition individual businesses operated with their own original missions 
and visions.  The mission and operating vision promoted by the new parent company was not 
accepted as being relevant to the Australian operations due to the culture that existed within 
the business unit.  Australian respondents believed that the unfocused and unclear ‘hollow’ 
employee orientated Finnish visions did not apply to their strongly profit and achievement 
focused culture.  Finnish respondents indicated that they believed the Finnish operations would 
continue as per their original visions due to the size of the organisation and the stability of the 
bureaucracy, despite the addition of the Australian operations.   Whilst the Finnish vision for the 
combined company had been formulated, it had not been effectively communicated and 
accepted by all business unit employees.  Australian and Finnish respondents indicated that 
they were not ‘working in the same direction’ at all times.  An effective, accepted and truly 
shared vision was needed by the business units to assist in ‘bringing the business units 
together as one’. 
 
Management and leadership involvement 
Guillen and Gonzalez (2001) argue the importance to differentiate between the roles of 
management in ‘management’ processes, and the role of management in ‘leadership’ 
processes.  The case suggests effective ‘management’ of the business units.  Acquisition 
processes and directives for change had been handed down from the new owners, and 
business units were monitored.  Business units did not however, experience the required 
‘leadership’ guidance and were not being guided or transformed in a common direction.  The 
case suggests that the only ‘leadership’ being provided to the respective business unit 
employees was from the original (pre-acquisition) founders of each organisation.  Beliefs and 
assumptions for operating the newly integrated organisation therefore, continued to be derived 
from their original culture and management.  Management involvement did not facilitate the 
transfer of integration plans, nor drive cultural integration change (Marks and Mirvis, 2001). 
 
Management’s role as leaders is also to ensure that key ‘not negotiable’ values, beliefs and 
norms are abided by and not rejected by differing organisational cultures (Simpson, 2002).  It is 
imperative that leaders set the proper tone for the acquisition and that they articulate the 
principles for the new organisation.  The principles must then be executed and monitored, and 
management must be prepared to act accordingly (Marks and Mirvis, 2001; Duffy, 1999).  Many 
of the concerns in the case were due to new systems, strategies and processes not being 
accepted by employees. 
 
According to Schein (1992) and Iles (2001), the unique and essential function of leadership in 
the acquisition and integration process is its role in manipulating culture.  Leaders can first gain 
an understanding of what needs to be done to manipulate the culture and then ‘unfreeze’ it so 
that meaningful change and acceptance can take place (McShane and von Glinow, 2000). 
Strong integration leadership between the business units would therefore provide assistance in 
re-aligning business unit management and employee attitudes.  It would also provide 
opportunity to relieve situations creating error, misunderstanding and conflict between 
employees from different business units. 
 
Respondents indicate that the business integration lacked management and leadership 
involvement.  Effective leadership was particularly important in the process of allowing 
employees within the Australian business unit to feel that they were ‘included’ as an important 
part of the acquisition process (Hagberg Consulting Group, 1998).  Australian respondents 
indicated that Australian employees had a relatively close ‘bond’, which was maintained by the 
‘business focus’ and culture. Employees therefore believed and assumed that they deserved to 
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be part of, or at least forewarned of management decisions.  Australians also desired effective 
avenues to challenge management decisions if decisions did not suit the ‘Australian’ business 
situation.  Strong leadership was required within the Finnish business unit to support the 
systemic and bureaucracy structures within the culture.    Finnish leaders are expected to 
deliver directives to employees while at the same time support and challenge the bureaucratic 
system where needed.  This was perceived necessary to accommodate cultural deviations and 
requirements during integration with the Australian operations. 
 
Cultural Understanding 
Achieving an awareness and understanding of differing national cultures within companies can 
be a difficult task (Hall, 1965; Iles, 2001).  Hofstede (1984) argues that members of any 
particular national culture or organisation either reject the notion of cultural dimensions being at 
play and feel threatened or upset by the concept, or find that gaining a better understanding of 
cultural differences is an enlightenment.  Once employees accept the impact of cultural 
limitations and differences, understanding takes place. 
 
There are no right or wrong perspectives when dealing with issues of culture.  Assumptions, 
views and beliefs of any culture are elements bound in ethnocentricity (Schein, 1992) and 
translate in different ways and means of achieving goals.  Increased cultural openness allows 
staff to assess the situation within its cultural contexts and be more open to differing views.  
This assists in removing the ‘us and them’ syndrome which often leads to disruption or conflict 
between international business units (Hofstede, 1984). 
 
The lack of cultural understanding and appreciation for the ‘other’ culture appeared to be an 
important cause of difficulties experienced in the integration of the Finnish and Australian 
business units.  There was little evidence by management or employees, acknowledging or 
accepting cultural differences as a way of explaining and approaching difficulties or tensions 
that arose during the integration process. 
 
Steps to improve the levels of understanding and awareness of cultural differences in the 
business units would have benefited the operations of the company overall.   Respondents 
provided no suggestion of specific formal culture training, assessment or planning being 
conducted in the company prior to, or during the integration.  In addition, individuals from both 
business units had relatively low levels of cultural awareness or cultural ‘openness’.  Low levels 
of cultural awareness led to assumptions that most individuals operate on similar beliefs and 
underlying assumptions.  Australians assumed that Finnish employees think and respond 
similar to themselves and visa versa. 
 
Cultural Change 
Academics and business leaders advocate that cultural change in young, newly acquired 
organisations should be limited (or even avoided) if an acquired organisation is already 
successful.  This is especially the case if there is little effective return from planned changes 
(Schein, 1992). Adams (2002) argues that anything that slides under the banner of cultural 
change is doomed to failure.  One of the most fundamental mistakes is to imply to organisations 
that they can’t maintain and live their own culture. 
 
Change is usually difficult for people to accept, as it is natural for humans to hold on to 
established methods, beliefs and ways of doing things (Schein, 1983).  Culture forms and acts 
to be a stabilising force within a group or community and therefore becomes difficult in itself to 
change (Hofstede, 1980). Respondents indicated that they believed the ‘other’ business unit, or 
associated culture, was attempting to ‘change’ the way things were being done in their 
business unit.  This was particularly the case with Australian respondents who complained that 
‘the Finnish owner had attempted to change almost everything within their business since 
acquisition.’  The Finnish respondents also commented that the Australians were not 
responding particularly well to the owner’s change initiatives. 
 
The case confirms Kellogg’s (2002) suggestion that people perceive their own organisational 
culture is the ‘best’ and ‘most suitable’ for post acquisition operations. Inevitably, what remains 
when the acquisition dust settles is an ‘us vs. them’ environment.  Usually, the more 
established, ‘stronger’, and politically dominant company ends up applying rules and changes 
McMullen and Soontiens 9 
A Finnish-Australian Acquisition:  Organisational Problems and Issues 
to the cultures of the ‘weaker’ company.  Kellogg (2002) also promotes the concept that 
acquiring companies should ‘not fix what isn’t broke’, and change should only be instigated 
where required in acquisitions.  Australian respondents believed the business unit was being 
adversely affected by ‘territory marking’ change, having little reason and producing little benefit. 
Many of such changes were said to have served only to increase tensions and resource 
wastage. 
 
Finnish embedded bureaucracy and size invariably contributes to dominance over the acquired 
companies (Fincham and Rhodes, 1999). In the case, change was reported to be promoted 
without considering reasons as assuming dominance was reportedly the ‘mind set’ of Finnish 
personnel while Finnish management assumed that directives were followed by employees.  
Australian respondents indicated a desire to maintain their original culture and believed they 
knew how to manage their operations more suitably than the new Finnish owners.  Culturally 
‘unsuitable’ and unsubstantiated change directives therefore, were criticized, or ignored by the 
Australian employees which reflects the Australian dislike for authoritarianism.  Australian 
employees also require greater transparency and interaction before accepting change and 




The construction of trust is the culmination of numerous components within the relationships 
and operations of the company.  Trust occurs when there are positive expectations of another 
party’s intentions and actions in risky situations (McShane and von Glinow, 2000).  
Organisations cannot operate effectively without trust (Asherman, Bing and Laroche, 2000).  
Trust between individuals within business units was found to be a serious issue for many of the 
respondents.  The development of trust was identified and accepted as an important part of 
dismantling cultural barriers and improving integration of the units.   
 
Close interactions and face to face meetings accelerate the accrual of trust.  O’Hara-Devereaux 
and Johansen (1994) states that face-to-face encounters are irreplaceable for both building 
trust and repairing shattered trust.  The violation of trust tends to affect ones approach to cross-
organisational citizenship behaviours and interpersonal relationship behaviours.  With 
continued violations of trust, employees’ psychological contracts can move from being relational 
to transactional, making dealings between offices less cooperative (McShane and von Glinow, 
2000).  In the case situation, it was inferred that there were high levels of trust between 
employees within each business unit.  There was also a degree of trust ‘between’ business 
units, although more fragile, difficult to accrue and exposure based.  Respondents also 
indicated that the individuals in each business unit had little opportunity for direct contact, due 
to the distance between locations and the relative difficulty in communicating on a regular basis. 
 
Maintenance of trust requires different input and output expectations in different cultures 
(Asherman, Bing and Laroche, 2000).  For example, in Australia employees gained trust 
through delivering on time and carrying out commitments.  Australian respondents felt a decline 
in trust of Finnish personnel if they did not effectively respond to operational requests.  Whilst 
members of business units generally trusted each other from the start of the integration process, 
trust decreased between operations in particular areas. 
 
A cultural integration plan must recognise the imbalance of forwarded trust between business 
units.  As an effective basis towards building stronger trust between the business units overall, 
Cummings and Bromiley (1996) suggest proceeding in steps that promote trust, whilst 
advocating strong tolerance between employees to allow for the ‘unknowns’ of culture.  In 
addition, Asherman, Bing and Laroche (2000) advocate encouragement of ‘emotional bonding’ 
and ‘conceptual understanding’ between global teams where possible.  Emotional bonding can 
be achieved through greater opportunity for face-to-face meetings, ‘after hours’ activities, etc.  
Conceptual understanding is achieved through providing employees with an intellectual 
understanding of how cultural similarities and differences influence business transactions.  
Whilst difficulties in interpretations of assumptions are still likely to arise in operations, the 
method provides a positive basis upon which trust can form.  At an operational level, higher 
levels of trust were offered to the Australians by the Finnish operations, than to the Finnish by 
the Australian. 
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Monitoring the integration environment 
The basic goal of environmental monitoring includes being as specific as possible, determining 
the exact nature of problems and concerns (operational or cultural), identifying what it would 
take to resolve the situation, and whether employees had the resources or required 
understanding to deal with the situation (Buono and Nurick, 1992).  Without environmental 
monitoring, employees can become frustrated and annoyed with issues.  Some respondents 
indicate that visible attempts to monitor and identify issues of concern would have generated a 
more positive atmosphere for business integration – a feeling that management was actually 
interested in assisting or rectifying situations. 
 
Management benefits from providing facilities to monitor, identify and manage the cultural 
integration process and at the same time create an opportunity to identify concerns within each 
of the business units (Adams, 2002).  The monitoring of environmental conditions at the 
different business units would have provided management with a better understanding of 
cultural issues and needs of employees. 
 
The case revealed a diversity of concerns and issues resulting from the integration process.  
Respondents believed that the issues were not effectively identified by the company or 
management provided no appropriate resolution and management has no realistic ‘picture’ of 
the post-integration company.  Rather than finding solutions to concerns and issues, 
employees indicate they are left to ‘fend for themselves’ with difficulties and frustrations of the 
integration process.  A failure to monitor the post-acquisition situation also meant that 
management was not fully aware of the knowledge and training needs of employees operating 
in the cross-cultural environment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The process of integration after acquiring an organisation directly reflects the planning and 
actual approach of the acquisition.  Even so, both organisations involved in the acquisition and 
integration contribute to the complexity by means of their national cultural background and the 
individual organisational culture.  Although it is virtually impossible to measure the impact of 
culture differences on the moral and productivity, there is little doubt over the adverse impact of 
culture differences on the integration process.   
 
The Finnish-Australian case indicates the dissatisfaction experienced by Australians, mostly 
attributable to cultural differences.  Although the acquisition was characterised by some 
business planning there was no cultural planning to anticipate differences in business cultures 
and future problems for integration.  An important aspect of successful integration is the 
establishment of a shared vision and understanding of purpose of either parties in the larger 
picture, a type of role identification.  This exercise should not be done in isolation or without 
consultation and it is imperative that all concerned parties are involved in the process.  The 
case implies that clear communication before, during and after acquisition and integration is 
deemed imperative to avoid the ‘us vs. them’ atmosphere.  In addition, both management and 
leadership must be provided throughout the acquisition and integration, both in terms of hard 
(profit, structure) and soft (staff, culture) issues.  While a clear overall vision and strategic goal 
is imperative to ensure cooperation, allowing business units freedom in identity is crucial to 
allow gradual integration.  The most important aspect derived from the case implies the 
importance of understanding and managing organisational and national culture.  Although not 
conclusive, evidence suggests that the nature and poor management of differences in 
organisational culture indeed sets an environment that can make or break initial successes of 
acquisition integration. 
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